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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
HENRY SCHEIN, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
JENNIFER COOK, 
Defendant. 
 
Case No.  16-cv-03166-JST    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
DENYING REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED 
DISCOVERY WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
Re: ECF No. 2 
 
Plaintiff Henry Schein, Inc. (“HSI”) has applied for a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”), alleging that Defendant and former HSI employee Jennifer Cook stole confidential data 
in violation of trade secret law and employment agreements.  ECF No. 2.  HSI requests a TRO 
preventing Cook from accessing, using, or sharing any of this data, as well as early discovery 
against Cook and her new, non-party employer.  The Court will grant the requested TRO and deny 
the request for early discovery. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 According to Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff HSI “is in the business of marketing, 
distributing, and selling medical, dental and veterinary supplies and equipment, and other 
healthcare products, to medical, dental, and veterinary practitioners, and other healthcare 
professionals and organizations.”  ECF No. 2-3 ¶ 2.  Defendant Cook was hired as a “Field Sales 
Consultant” with HSI in April 2005, and entered into a Confidentiality and Non-Solicitation 
Agreement in 2005, as well as a Letter Agreement in 2011 that required her to hold “in strictest 
confidence” any confidential information “concerning the products, processes, services, business, 
suppliers, and customers of HSI,” and to “neither copy nor take any such material upon leaving 
Company’s employ.”  ECF No. 2-1 at 9-10.  Cook resigned from HSI on May 13, 2016, and began 
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working for one of HSI’s competitors, Patterson Dental (“Patterson”).  Id. at 7, 11. 
 Plaintiff alleges that prior to leaving HSI, Cook “began to loot HSI’s confidential, 
proprietary, and trade secret documents and information with the apparent goal of diverting HSI’s 
customers.”  On May 10, Cook forwarded from her work email account, to her personal email, 
“several comprehensive, confidential HSI customer practice reports that were produced using 
HSI’s proprietary software,” which all “contained a wide array of confidential and trade secret 
information.”  Id. at 11.  On May 12, 2016, the day before she resigned, Cook forwarded 
“numerous additional customer-related reports, including an equipment inventory report, price 
quotations for prospective customers, and equipment proposals on which HSI was working.”  Id.  
On May 13, Cook “logged into HSI’s system with HSI’s proprietary ‘FSC’ computer program,” 
which “had the effect of ‘updating’ onto Cook’s laptop, substantial, specific, customer related 
sales and ordering data from the HSI computer system.”  Id.  She then failed to return her laptop to 
HSI for two weeks.  Id.  On May 14, the day after she resigned, Cook “unlawfully accessed the 
HSI computer system, this time using a web-based ‘iPad app’ and her company credentials.”  Id.  
This type of access “would enable Cook to obtain on her iPad, large amounts of ordering and 
purchase data for each of the HSI customers that had been assigned to her.”  Id. 
Cook also attempted to erase the e-mails that she sent from her HSI computer.  Id. at 12.  
Before her resignation, Cook “also attempted to divert HSI customers to Patterson,” and “visited 
the offices of certain HSI customers, deleted the HSI product ordering icon from their computer 
systems and destroyed HSI catalogues and business cards.”  Id.1 
On June 9, 2016, the same day HSI applied for a TRO, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging 
eight causes of action: (1) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
(DTSA), 18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq.; (2) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Under the California 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), Cal. Civ. Code § 3426, et seq.; (3) Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty and Duty of Loyalty; (4) Breach of Written Contract; (5) Breach of Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (6) Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 
                                                 
1
 HSI’s moving papers are notably silent regarding the date on which it discovered Cook’s alleged 
bad acts.   
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(7) Violation of California Unfair Competition Law (UCL); (8) Violation of California Penal Code 
§ 502.  ECF No. 1.  Plaintiff also filed a declaration stating it attempted service of the complaint 
and application for TRO by e-mailing a copy to Cook’s personal e-mail address and causing 
copies to be hand-delivered to Cook’s last known home address.  ECF No. 2-4. 
II. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the DTSA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
Further, a federal district court may issue an injunction to preserve the status quo even when 
subject matter jurisdiction is disputed or unclear.  U.S. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 
258, 293 (1947). 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
The same legal standard applies to a motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion 
for a preliminary injunction.  See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 
839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001).  A plaintiff seeking either remedy “must establish that he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”  
Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Winter v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  Injunctive relief is 
“an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 
entitled to such relief.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 
To grant preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find that “a certain threshold showing 
is made on each factor.”  Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011).  Provided that 
this has occurred, in balancing the four factors, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a 
balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary 
injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and 
that the injunction is in the public interest."  Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 
1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).   
In addition, a movant seeking the issuance of an ex parte TRO must satisfy Federal Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 65(b), which requires a showing “that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and 
certification of “efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).   
IV. DISCUSSION 
 Plaintiff requests a TRO that prevents Cook from “accessing, using, disclosing, or making 
available” any of HSI’s confidential data, from violating any of her agreements with HSI, and 
from soliciting, contacting, or accepting business from any HSI customers assigned to her while 
she was employed by Plaintiff.  ECF No. 2-5 at 4.  In addition, Plaintiff also requests that Cook be 
ordered to preserve all evidence related to this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(d)(1) and be 
enjoined from altering, destroying, or disposing of any materials related to this action, including 
any confidential information she obtained from HSI.  Id. at 3.  Finally, Plaintiff requests, both in 
its proposed TRO and as a motion for expedited discovery, that it be allowed to obtain “mirrors” 
of all data stored on Cook’s personal devices, and to subpoena the Patterson entities and obtain 
other discovery from Cook.  ECF No. 2-5 at 4-5.  The Court will grant Plaintiff’s first two requests 
but deny without prejudice its request to obtain mirrors from Cook and early discovery. 
 A. TRO 
  1. Likelihood of Irreparable Injury 
 Plaintiff contends there is a likelihood of irreparable injury by virtue of Defendant’s 
“exploiting or disclosing HSI’s trade secret and other confidential information; violating her 
confidentiality obligation to HSI; or soliciting business from HSI’s customers whose accounts she 
was assigned while at HSI.”  ECF No. 2-1 at 14.   They allege that Cook had access to, and 
downloaded, “information related to HSI’s customers, products, margins, profit percentages, credit 
profiles, preferences and markets, particularly with respect to the customers assigned to her,” and 
that this data was created “using proprietary HSI software.”  ECF No. 2-1 at 7.  They further 
allege that Cook has used this information and made other efforts to divert customers from HSI to 
her new employer, Patterson.  Id. at 14. 
Customer information such as sales history and customer needs and preferences constitute 
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trade secrets.  MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521 (9th Cir. 1993).  Further, 
“[e]vidence of threatened loss of prospective customers or goodwill certainly supports a finding of 
the possibility of irreparable harm.”  Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 
832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  Here, Plaintiff has shown there is a likelihood that it 
will lose established customer relationships as well as the economic value of its accumulated data 
on current and prospective customers.  These harms would likely be irreparable.  See, e.g., Tom 
Doherty Associates, Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 1995) (irreparable harm 
exists when there is “a threatened imminent loss that will be very difficult to quantify at trial.”).  In 
addition, it appears this loss may occur before Cook may be heard in opposition, as Plaintiff has 
alleged that Cook has already misappropriated HSI’s customer information and sought to solicit 
and divert customers. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. 
 2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Plaintiff has brought claims under the DTSA, CUTSA, UCL, and for breach of contract, 
among other claims.  It contends that Defendant has used “improper means” to obtain its protected 
customer-related information as defined by both the DTSA and CUTSA.  ECF No. 2-1 at 16-17; 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (defining “improper means” as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, 
breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or 
other means”); Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(a) (defining “improper means” as “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage 
through electronic or other means”). 
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant e-mailed and downloaded, to her personal devices, 
confidential information from HSI before leaving her employment to work at a competitor.  It has 
also provided copies of a Confidential and Non-Solicitation Agreement and a Letter Agreement 
with provisions for confidentiality and non-solicitation, both of which appear to be signed by 
Cook, as exhibits to its complaint.  ECF No. 1 at 24-29.  In light of these contentions, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. 
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 3. Balance of Hardships 
Plaintiff contends that it “has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm if Cook 
is allowed to continue to try to divert its customers using HSI’s own confidential, proprietary, and 
trade secret documents and information.”  ECF No. 2-1 at 24.  “By contrast, Cook will suffer no 
undue hardship” because she would not be prohibited from “engaging in activity that is proper.”  
Id.  Notably, HSI has not requested that Cook be enjoined from soliciting any and all business, but 
rather only from soliciting HSI customers to which she was assigned – conduct that is already 
prohibited under the provisions of the Confidentiality and Non-Solicitation Agreement.  
Accordingly, the Court concludes the balance of equities tips in favor of granting the TRO.  See 
Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ramirez, No. 15-CV-04712-BLF, 2016 WL 3092184, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
June 2, 2016) (balance of hardships tips in favor of plaintiff seeking injunction when it would “do 
no more than require Defendant to comply with federal and state . . . laws” (citation omitted)). 
 4.  Public Interest 
Similarly, the public interest is served when defendant is asked to do no more than abide 
by trade laws and the obligations of contractual agreements signed with her employer.  Public 
interest is also served by enabling the protection of trade secrets.  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lee, No. 
CV 08-5546 CAS(JWJX), 2008 WL 4351348, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2008).   
 Accordingly, the Court concludes that all four factors for a TRO have been met and will 
grant the requested TRO prohibiting Defendant from accessing or using HSI information and from 
contacting or soliciting HSI customers.  Plaintiff argues that no bond should be required because 
the TRO will not cause any damage to Cook’s legitimate business, and further because she agreed, 
in her employment agreements with HSI, that HSI may seek injunctive relief without a bond.  ECF 
No. 2-1 at 25.  The Court agrees, and concludes no bond is required. 
 B. Document Preservation and Early Discovery 
 Plaintiff has also made several requests in regards to preserving materials that Cook 
allegedly misappropriated from HSI and evidence of this misappropriation, and to preventing 
Cook from attempting to destroy this evidence.  First, they request that the Court order Cook to 
preserve all documents, data, tangible things, and other materials relating to the case, and further 
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that she not alter, destroy, or dispose of any evidence or materials related to this case.  ECF No. 2-
5 at 3.  This is a reasonable request – indeed, litigants are generally obligated to maintain and 
preserve all documents, data, and tangible things that may be related to the  litigation, pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a) and 37(e).  Accordingly, the Court will grant this request. 
 However, Plaintiff has also requested, both in its proposed TRO and a motion for 
expedited discovery, that Plaintiff be able immediately to obtain, through a forensics expert, a 
“clone” or “mirror image” of data in Cook’s personal e-mail accounts, her personal iPad, iPhone, 
computers, other mobile devices, and any other computer storage drives.  ECF No. 2-5 at 4.  It 
further requests expedited discovery in the form of subpoenas issued to “non-party Patterson 
Dental, and the Patterson Companies, Inc.,” and “expedited discovery demands on Defendant 
Cook.”  Id. at 5.  It contends that because Cook has already sought to destroy evidence – by 
deleting her e-mails from her work account to her personal account – it is likely she will attempt to 
do so again.  ECF No. 2-1 at 15. 
 This argument does not justify an intrusion into Cook’s personal data and devices without 
first providing Cook an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s contentions.  Cook will already be 
obligated, under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this order, to avoid altering, 
damaging, or destroying any evidence, electronic or otherwise, that is related to this litigation.  If 
she nevertheless fails to comply with this obligation, Plaintiff may move for sanctions or other 
appropriate remedies.  Further, while this Court recognizes Plaintiff’s allegations that Cook has 
previously attempted to cover her tracks, it also notes that HSI was nevertheless able to obtain 
evidence of her alleged misconduct through reviewing the e-mails “set for deletion” and “still on 
HSI’s system.”  ECF No. 2-1. 
 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s ex parte request to obtain mirrors of data 
on Cook’s personal devices is not warranted.  To the extent Plaintiff requests this as part of its 
TRO, the Court concludes it has not demonstrated that the balance of hardships tips in its favor, 
given the significant intrusion into Cook’s personal data with no opportunity for Cook to respond.  
For the same reasons, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for early discovery.  See Grooms 
v. Legge, No. 09CV489-IEG-POR, 2009 WL 704644, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2009) (“Good 
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cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration 
of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.”). 
Plaintiff’s cited case law does not compel otherwise.  In both KLA-Tencor Corp. v. 
Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2010) and Grooms v. Legge, No. 09CV489-IEG-
POR, 2009 WL 704644, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2009), the approved expedited discovery was 
in the form of oral depositions and written interrogatories, requests for identification, and 
production of documents.  Here, by contrast, Plaintiff has requested an intrusive excursion into 
Cook’s private data, much of which is likely unrelated to this case. 
In regards to Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery in the form of subpoenas, the Court 
concludes HSI has not demonstrated good cause.  While subpoenas of Patterson entities and other 
discovery directed at Cook may certainly be appropriate at a later stage, Plaintiff has offered no 
reason why this discovery must be taken immediately.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for 
expedited discovery is denied without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a temporary 
restraining order as follows: 
1. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1), Defendant shall immediately 
preserve all documents, data, tangible things, and other materials relating to this case, 
including, without limitation, emails, data, data bases, cloud storage, and paper and 
electronic data and documents, including any and all metadata, and shall take all steps 
necessary to do so. 
2. Defendant, and all those acting in concert or participation with her, are hereby 
enjoined from altering, destroying, or disposing of any evidence or other materials, in any 
form, relating to this action and the issues raised herein, including, without limitation, all 
devices, electronic media, cloud storage, and all copies of any and all documents, media 
and/or other materials, containing, identifying, describing, reflecting or referencing HSI’s 
confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information, and any and all documents, data and 
information which was obtained by Cook from, or by virtue of her employment with, HSI, 
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including all current or archived media, emails, chats, texts, documents, electronic logs, 
metadata, storage and directories 
3. Defendant, and all those acting in concert or participation with her, are hereby 
enjoined from directly or indirectly accessing, using, disclosing, or making available to any 
person or entity other than Plaintiff, any of HSI’s confidential, proprietary, or trade secret 
documents, data or information. 
4. Defendant, and all those acting in concert or participation with her, are hereby 
enjoined from directly or indirectly violating or interfering with the confidentiality 
obligations of her agreements with HSI. 
5. Defendant, and all those acting in concert or participation with her, are hereby 
enjoined from, directly or indirectly, soliciting, continuing to solicit, initiating contact 
with, or accepting business from, any HSI customers whose accounts were assigned to her 
while she was employed by HSI. 
6. The Court concludes that no bond need by posted by HSI. 
7. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a TRO directing a forensics expert to obtain 
mirrors of Plaintiff’s data and personal devices.  It denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s 
request for expedited discovery. 
8. This temporary restraining order shall remain in effect through June 21, 2016, or 
unless further extended by order of the Court. 
9. A hearing on whether to issue a preliminary injunction will be held on June 21, 
2016 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, 
California. 
10. Defendant may, but is not required to, file a written response to Plaintiff’s motion 
for preliminary injunction by Monday, June 20 at 12:00 p.m.  The Court will not entertain 
a reply.   
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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11. Plaintiff shall immediately serve a copy of this order on Defendant, and shall file a 
certificate of service within forty-eight hours of this order’s issuance.  The certificate of 
service must describe the efforts made at service and when the efforts were made.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  June 10, 2016 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 
 
